The general thesis 1 want to defend in this paper is the following: the knowledge by acquaintance with an indeterminate object is not sufficient to guarantee the naming of this object because the acquaintance with it is not sufficient to guarantee neither its identification nor its future reidentification. If I am right in defending this thesis, then it should be accepted that the reference made by demonstratives depends on primitive elements with predicative function. Now, if this point about demonstratives (which (...) Russell called logical proper names) could be established with some plausibility, important supports for the rigid designation's thesis about proper names would be lost. In this case, a moderate descriptivistic theory of proper names could be vindicated. I am interested on this last consequence of my argumentation but I will not develop it here. What I intend to do is to reconstruct the Russell's theory of names, specially his theory of the logical proper mimes, to discuss the distinction between naming and describing and than to argue against the referential privilege of demonstratives. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Tugendhat's moral philosophy by focusing on his conception of moral justification and the role sentiments play in it. In order to understand, and to criticize, the relationship between reasons and sentiments in Tugendhat's moral philosophy, the correlation between judgment and affection is scrutinized. Furthermore, I argue that as far as the innermost structure of morality is concerned individuals have far less autonomy to accept or reject any moral system than Tugendhat is prepared to admit. /// (...) En este artículo discuto la filosofía moral de Tugendhat mediante la investigatión de su concepción de justificación moral y del papel que los sentimientos desempeñan en ella. Para comprender y criticar la relatión entre razones y sentimientos en la filosofía moral de Tugendhat, analizo la correlación entre juicio y afecto. Sostengo, además, que, en lo que atañe a la estructura más básica de la moralidad, los individuos tienen mucho menos autonomía para aceptar o rechazar un sistema moral de lo que Tugendhat está dispuesto a admitir. (shrink)